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Since 1972, there has been an association between terrorism, violence, and the 
Olympic Games. The events of September 11, 2001, however, clearly reescalated 
concerns about the Games being a terrorist target. This conceptual article discusses 
the theories of the risk society and the precautionary principle to understand and 
interpret how visitors to the most recent Summer Games, Athens 2004, framed 
their decision to attend. Consistent with risk theory, a strong public and financial 
commitment to safety at the Games was evident, with the organizers undertaking 
wide-ranging large-scale risk management initiatives. Athens attendees, while 
displaying tenets of risk aversion and engagement with a discourse of fear, also 
showed resilience, resistance, and indifference to potential terrorism threats. 
Implications for both theory and practice are noted.
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the increased threat of terrorism has brought 
risk management to the forefront of mega-sport-event planning and has resulted in 
a range of new security measures for sport spectators and tougher safety standards 
for organizers. Although there has been considerable scholarly enquiry into the 
causes and effects of terrorism as it relates to tourism and events in general (cf. Hall, 
Timothy, & Duval, 2003), there has been a lack of academic research investigating 
the emotional responses of sport event spectators to the threat of terrorism and how 
this response impacts management.
Terrorist-based risk associated with sport spectating in the 21st century is not 
without substance, because there have been 168 terrorist attacks related to sport 
between 1972 and 2004 (Clark, 2004; Kennelly, 2005). These data indicate that 
terrorism at sporting events is not just a post-9/11 problem. The intensity of media 
and governmental moral panics and event organizers’ responses to terrorism since 
9/11, however, have brought the issue to the attention of the world in a manner 
similar to the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Olympic attack.
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Atkinson and Young (2002) provide a general explanation of the nexus between 
sport and terrorism:
For many reasons, individual terrorists or terrorist organizations might find 
suitable targets in athletes participating in games, spectators attending the 
events, or selected corporate sponsors of sports contests. Especially in those 
situations where athletic contests draw sizeable international audiences in 
geographical settings already embroiled in strife, sport can be utilized as a 
vehicle for political sparring, and waging and disseminating forms of political 
violence against others. (p. 54)
Other more general connections can also be drawn and, in some extreme cases, 
sport spaces have chillingly been converted to sites of state-sponsored terrorism. 
For example, in Afghanistan, Kabul’s main sport venue, Ghazi Stadium, was used 
by the Taliban to carry out public executions during halftime at sporting events. In 
addition, engaging in military-style physical training has been an important part 
of some terrorists’ preparation (Toohey & Taylor, 2006).
Despite the numerous direct and indirect links between sport and terrorism, 
academic inquiry into sport violence has primarily concentrated on the causes and 
effects of player and spectator violence (Atkinson & Young, 2002). Moreover, most 
of these studies have been located in discourses of sport sociology or psychology and 
criminology, investigating the cognitive, affective and overt behavioral aspects of 
violence. Implications drawn for sport management have primarily been associated 
with crowd control, risk management and athlete management (cf. Kennelly, 2004; 
Rubin, 2004; Whisenant, 2003). There are, however, other broader environmental 
consequences of the relationship between violence (especially terrorism) and sport, 
for example, sociocultural factors, which impact the management of sport events 
and, as such, need to be better understood by sport management practitioners and 
academics alike. Amis and Silk (2005, p. 359) suggest that, “in addressing an orga-
nizationally based problem—an understanding of the context in which the research 
takes place is vital.” Adding to this external focus, Frosdick (1999, p. 138) suggests 
that, “cultural analysis has an important role to play in the study of management 
in general, including the management of public safety and order.” One aspect of 
understanding the context and culture of terrorist risk at sport events is to begin 
understanding “risk as a multitude of perceptions about the source and level of 
threat or danger” (Frosdick, 1999, p. 38).
Accordingly, examining the sport spectator’s perceptions of the risk of terrorism 
needs to be grounded in understanding relevant theoretical and contextual literature, 
which can involve other disciplines. As Pitts (2001, p. 1) argues, sport management 
needs to expand its dominant paradigms, “beyond the passive acceptance of con-
structed definitions and positions about sport management and its content without 
question. Thus, it is both necessary and prudent to view sport management beyond 
the traditional view of managing sports.” Similarly, Skinner and Edwards (2005, 
p. 416) advise that, “sport management researchers should be encouraged to take 
more methodological risks and embrace more eclectic research approaches.”
We propose that, by understanding the ‘risk society’ and what this means in 
for sport event management, we can challenge dominant sport management para-
digms and provide an emergent theoretical background by which to understand 
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the impact of terrorism on sport event spectators. This also has application for 
sport event practitioners. Elliot, Frosdick, and Smith (1999) believe “the stadia 
industry has something to learn . . . from the research that has been carried out by 
academics in the areas of safety culture and crisis management” (p. 26). Through 
using the concept of the risk society we are able to identify and situate related sport 
management issues, such as terrorism, in a broader context. We do so in this article 
by locating these discussions of terrorism and risk alongside a contextual overview 
of terrorism risks at Olympic Games from 1972 onwards.
The context of terrorism has relevance to sport events, and the potential and real-
ized impacts on the management of contemporary sport events have been profound 
(Taylor & Toohey, 2006). As such, the lack of published research in this area is 
surprising. In this article, we use the conceptualization of risk to frame the reactions, 
expectations, and perceptions of spectators to the post 9/11 security environment 
and to analyze resultant measures to deal with possible terrorist threats. This is a 
different theoretical perspective from the “positivist orientation” that dominates 
much of sport management research (Frisby, 2005, p. 4), and it provides a basis 
from which to interrogate how Western society’s embracement of the “precautionary 
principle” and the growth of the risk society underpin the organization of mega-
sporting events (Toohey, 2006). This alternative approach has meant that security 
measures no longer only involve what Coaffee and Wood (2006) describe as a 
“rings of steel” mentality, characterized by regulatory management, fortification, 
and surveillance, as was instituted at the 1976 Olympic Games in response to the 
1972 terrorist attack. Its primary principle was to categorize, divide, and control 
Olympic sites. More recently, the Olympic security paradigm has shifted. It now 
augments the rings of steel attitude, to one that has also encouraged resilience, 
both physically and managerially, through more counterterrorism measures and 
dispersing security responsibilities to different agencies and governments, rather 
than just organizing committees (Coaffee & Wood, 2006).
Terrorism
Terrorism has wide-reaching ramifications in social, political, and financial terms. 
For example, in the latter domain, during 2005, the global cost of fighting terrorism 
was estimated to be about US$191 billion, and this amount is predicted to triple 
within a decade (Agence France-Presse, 2005). In regard to sport, “it has been 
estimated that organizers of sporting events worldwide spend over $2 billion per 
annum on security, although in years where ‘blanket security’ is required for major 
events this figure can rise to $6 billion” (Coaffee & Wood, 2006, p. 513).
In its modern guise, terrorism dates from 1968, the year that hijackings and 
bombings of planes first captured the attention of world media and governments. 
Three factors have aided its territorial and hegemonic escalation: “the expansion 
of air travel; the wider availability of televised news coverage; and broad common 
political and ideological threats” (Kiras, 2005, p. 482).
There is still no universally accepted definition of terrorism; however, scholars 
believe there are elements common to most terrorist acts. First, they are usually 
committed by groups who do not possess the political power to change policies they 
believe are insupportable. Second, terrorists often justify their acts on ideological 
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or religious grounds, arguing that they are responding, not to existing laws, but 
trying to right to a greater wrong or promoting a greater good. Third, targets are 
selected to maximize negative psychological effects on societies or governments 
(Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2006). Richardson (2006) points out that terror-
ists have both long- and short-term motivations. In terms of immediate objectives 
“they want to exact revenge, they want to acquire glory and they want to force their 
adversary into a reaction” (Richardson, 2006, p. 14).
For these reasons, it is logical that terrorists will choose methods of mass 
destruction, such as bombings, and target transport or places where people gather, 
such as sport stadia. Terrorists also plan their acts to get as much media exposure 
as possible thus giving attention to their cause (Whisenant, 2003). These reasons 
explain why mega sport events such as the Olympic Games are seen as possible 
terrorist targets. Tarlow (2002) cataloged a range of logistical reasons why sport 
events might appear to be attractive targets. Spectator numbers and flows make 
it difficult to physically identify terrorists; the proximity of events to transporta-
tion hubs allow quick escape routes; and event-associated hospitality sectors 
(for example, live sites, hotels, and restaurants) have the potential to be affected, 
spreading the reach and impact of a sporting terrorist incident (Hadfield, Toohey, 
Taylor, & Mason, 2004).
Just as the media play a central role in the broadcasting of terrorist attacks 
and their aftermath, the media also can be a major influence in shaping govern-
ment policy in relation to disaster planning and management (Trim & Caravelli, 
2007). In consequence, as a countermeasure to recent terrorist activity, a range 
of risk management strategies have been implemented by relevant governments 
and event organizers to prevent possible attacks. In terms of the Olympic Games, 
the variety of tactics used have included the deployment of Olympic police and 
military units to dedicated Olympic units to patrol the host city and country; the 
creation of Olympic Intelligence Centers to monitor information and coordinate 
responses; the formation of international Olympic Security task forces to share 
information between nations; the increasing use of surveillance, including digital 
surveillance to augment people; and the implementation of progressively more 
complex technology to prevent unauthorized access (Johnson, 2006). These mea-
sures have meant that sport event organizers have had to work closely with relevant 
government security agencies and have had to balance what Johnson (2006) refers 
to as the push−pull dilemma of “limited budget versus infinite demands” (p. 14). 
The resultant success or otherwise of these measures will be described in greater 
detail later in the article.
Theoretical Framework
The importance of risk in and to society is not a static phenomenon. Risk refers 
to dangers that we seek to actively identify, confront and control (Giddens, 1998). 
Although fears about personal safety are not new, the global dimensions of fear 
and associated risk are of far more recent origin.
According to Frosdick (1999) the modern concept of risk originated in the 
17th century and grew from the study of probabilities associated with gambling. 
In the next century, risk assessment was the foundation of the maritime insurance 
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business and one century later it was incorporated into the study of economics. 
In the 20th century, the notion of risk took on more pessimistic connotations and 
was primarily associated with how to avoid genuine or perceived hazards. In recent 
decades, risk has become increasingly prominent as a litigious concept: It has also 
been politicized and now affects how we perceive our daily lives and our future. 
Durodié (2004a) observed that, “in recent times the concept of risk itself has gradu-
ally altered from one that captured possibility and engagement in the active sense 
of ‘taking a risk’, to one that increasingly reflects a growing sense of doom and 
distance from events, as evidenced in growing reference to the passive phrase of 
‘being at risk.’ Risk used to be a verb. Now it has become a noun” (p. 14). Risks 
have also become more global.
The Risk Society
The work of Ulrich Beck (1992), presented in his seminal work, Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity, first conceptualized a new phenomena of environmen-
tally based global risks; the subsequent growing public commitment to preventing 
further risks; the effects of new risks on people’s world views; and the lobby/govern-
ment/media-driven resultant moral panics. Beck (1992) termed the outcome of this 
combination of factors as “the risk society.” Although he was primarily concerned 
with global risks that resulted from environmental catastrophes, Beck’s dystopian 
viewpoint has since been broadened to encompass modernity’s more general preoc-
cupation with risk (cf. Spence, 2005). Contemporary “risk society is based on the 
view that more and more aspects of our lives are framed by an awareness of the 
dangers confronting humankind at the individual, local and global level, and the 
need to develop strategies to confront these dangers” (Kenny, 2004, p. 1)
Importantly, risks might only exist in our scholarly knowledge of them (i.e. 
through dire predictions of the future), that is, they might or might not actually 
occur. As Beck (1992) argued, this means that
They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within knowl-
edge, and to that extent they are particularly open to scientific definition and 
construction. Hence, the mass media and the scientific and legal professions in 
charge of defining risks . . . [have] key social and political positions. (p. 23)
Knowledge, or rather our predictions based on assumed knowledge leading 
to risk assessment thus assumes a new significance, can result in moral panics, 
and may polarize experts, nations, political parties, organizations and individuals 
(Beck, 2002).
As a new risk becomes public and political, it is debated, not just in terms of 
the risk itself, but also in light of its social, economic and political consequences. 
As a result of the risk society, the precautionary principle has governed risk man-
agement. The precautionary principle holds that
The absence of evidence of risk is not evidence of the absence of risk, and that 
rather than waiting for evidence of harm to be demonstrated before acting, 
the burden of proof should be shifted to require sponsors of a risky product or 
activity to demonstrate that it is safe or else be subject to regulatory restriction 
or ban. (Stern & Weiner, 2006, p. 394)
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Beck’s risk society premise has become a contemporary reality, and as a result risk 
management has become a growth industry in Western cultures.
Yet, because we are part of the greater social order, how society perceives risk 
also affects us at the individual level. Durodié (2004b) has argued that “far from this 
erosion of old community values . . . giving rise to a new confident individualism, 
what we have seen is the emergence of a disconnecting process of individuation. . 
. . Subjective impressions of reality . . . go unchecked, unmediated or unmoderated 
through membership of a wider group or association” (p. 15). Furedi (2002) posited 
that we now live our lives guided by a ‘precautionary principle’. He believes that 
risk aversion prevails in virtually every domain of human activity. In his book, 
Culture of Fear, Furedi (2002) wrote,
Many panics about the environment or technology had a similar structure to 
today’s fear about more mundane matters, such as risky relations between 
people. Concern with safety is just as intense in the area of personal relations 
as it is in environmental issues. (p. viii)
He also suggested that the most damaging consequence of the precautionary 
principle is how risk aversion influences interpersonal behavior, by subjecting 
personal relations to the calculus of risk (Furedi, 2002). Further, as Altheide (2003) 
argued:
In addition to propaganda effects, the constant use of fear pervades crises and 
normal times: it becomes part of the taken-for-granted world of “how things 
are”, and one consequence is that it begins to influence how we perceive and 
talk about everyday life, including mundane as well as significant events. This 
produces a discourse of fear, the pervasive communication, symbolic aware-
ness, and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of everyday 
life. (p. 38)
Fear and Anxiety
Risk has now morphed from Beck’s global ecological crises to a growing assess-
ment of risk in terms of our personal experiences. As a consequence, to feel safe, 
many people will disengage from their communities. Withdrawal creates a new 
spiral of concern because we fear what we do not know. Some writers have gone 
so far to describe present Western culture as being an “age of anxiety” (Durodié, 
2005, p. 6). Thus, paradoxically, while developed nations are becoming more global 
in many aspects of life, their populations are becoming more isolated within their 
local communities.
As Furedi (2002) observes, what is mystifying about this fear is that:
Many of our fears are not based on our personal experiences. Compared with 
the past, people living in Western societies have less familiarity with pain, 
suffering, debilitating disease and death than ever before. And yet, despite an 
unprecedented level of personal security, fear has become an ever expanding 
part of our life. Western societies are increasingly dominated by a culture of 
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fear. The defining feature of this culture is the belief that humanity is confronted 
by powerful destructive forces that threaten our everyday existence. (p. vii)
This milieu propagates an environment in which violent acts such as terrorism 
can intensify alarm. Ironically, this fear is what terrorism seeks. As Ericson and 
Doyle (2004) noted, “terrorists are explicitly in the business of uncertainty. They 
play on randomness to keep whole populations in fear, anticipation, and disestab-
lishment. They precipitate the urge for more certainty, expressed through escalating 
security measures” (p. 141). This cycle is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Thus, it is logical that the 2004 Athens Olympic Games were described as 
an attractive option for terrorists who wished to communicate their message to 
a global audience of billions, strike the cradle of Western democracy, and attack 
Western citizens and interests (Migdalovitz, 2004). This was by no means the first 
time that the Games have been beleaguered in this manner.
Ericson and Doyle (2004, p. 141) noted that “the terrorist power of uncertainty 
is especially strong because we do live in a risk society. This society is characterized 
by a cultural desire to tame chance and effect security and by institutions increas-
ingly organized around risk management’ (Garland, 2003). Terrorism strikes at 
the foundation of a risk society because it is a stark reminder of the limits to risk 
assessment and management.
In this context, it is not sufficient to manage corporations to optimize production 
variables, such as profits, productivity, jobs, and growth. Corporations must 
manage risk variables, such as . . . public safety. This type of management 
does not mean simply an expansion of the management agenda to include new 
risks. It implies a fundamental reversal in the focus of managers’ attention, 
Figure 1—The relationship between terrorism and sport events.
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that is, substituting the production orientation of existing paradigms with the 
risk orientation of a new paradigm. The traditional management paradigm was 
developed for the industrial society; thus, it is inherently limited in many ways 
for meeting the challenges of the “risk” society. (Shrivastava, 1995, p. 123)
The Olympic Games provide a robust example of how the risk society has 
affected the consumption and management of sport, in regards to their approach 
to the response to terrorism.
The Olympic Games and the Risk of Terrorism
Since the advent of satellite television and the resultant juggernaut of Olympic 
global penetration, the Games’ resultant success has made them hostage to political 
manipulation, including instrumental violence such as terrorism. Since the Black 
September group’s attack on Israeli athletes and officials at 1972 Munich Games, 
politically motivated violence has had an effect on the Olympic Games on a number 
of different levels, from the tangible increased security measure costs to what has 
been quixotically described as the Olympic Games’ “loss of innocence” (Moore, 
1996, p. 30). The international attention achieved by the attack resonated beyond 
the sporting milieu. It demonstrated that terrorism could be an effective tactic in 
challenging governments and raising international awareness of a cause (Johnson, 
2001). In keeping with the notion of a risk society, it also meant that responsibil-
ity for the attack could be attributed to global forces. Thus, it is no surprise that, 
in its Official Report to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Munich 
Games Organizing Committee (1974) claimed “that the occurrences of September 
5, 1972 were possible cannot be blamed on the security service. Its employment 
and behavior expressed the overall conception of the Olympic Games” (p. 347).
Despite these claims, the Organizing Committee of the XXth Olympic Games 
in Munich in 1972 had commissioned the president of the Munich police force to 
advise it on all security matters; organize, supervise, and direct the security service; 
and award security contracts. In terms of the Olympic Village, the remit of the 
security force was to protect the Village from trespass by unauthorized persons and 
provide a general access control function; settle minor disruptions; and intervene in 
cases of criminal activity; and control traffic (Organizing Committee for the Games 
of the XXth Olympiad, 1974). This responsibility was not met.
Initial calculations by Games organizers had estimated that the number of 
Olympic security service employees needed would be in the order of 1,740. As 
planning became more detailed, it was realized that this number would be insuf-
ficient and staffing levels rose to 2,130. This increase in security personnel was 
insufficient to prevent tragedy, however. On September 5, 1972 at 4:40 a.m., 
eight Palestinians disguised as Olympic athletes entered the Olympic Village and 
entered the Israeli team quarters, taking nine hostages and killing two others. The 
alarm was raised and one hour later, Willi Daume (the President of the Organizing 
Committee), the Organizing Committee’s security authorities, and the Munich 
police president (Dr. Manfred Schreiber) met. From this point on, the authority to 
deal with the terrorists was subordinated to the police, who have been blamed for 
much of the subsequent mishandling of the rescue efforts, when all the remaining 
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hostages, a German policeman, and five of the terrorists were killed (Organizing 
Committee for the Games of the XXth Olympiad, 1974).
There was considerable criticism of the response of Games organizers to their 
handling of the attack itself and also of its impact on the operation of the Games. 
For example, despite the fact that Avery Brundage (the President of the IOC), 
members of the IOC executive board, and Willi Daume were in conference all that 
day, it was not until 3:30 p.m. that they made a decision to suspend competition 
(Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXth Olympiad, 1974). The IOC 
also decided that
The Games would be resumed in the afternoon of September 6, 1972 after a 
memorial ceremony that morning in Olympic Stadium and the Games would be 
extended by a day. . . . In addition, the IOC decided to cancel any further recep-
tions during the Games, to end the performances at the “amusement street,” 
and to revise the program of the closing ceremony, giving it a subdued form. 
(Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXth Olympiad, 1974, p. 36)
Some nations demanded that the Games be cancelled; however, the IOC ruled 
against this, reasoning that if it did so then the Games would be susceptible to further 
terrorist attacks. A further criticism of the IOC occurred when, during his speech 
at the Closing Ceremony, Avery Brundage related the terrorist attack with the issue 
of Rhodesia’s participation. The following day he issued an apology regretting any 
misunderstanding of his words (Toohey & Veal, 2000).
The Munich Games organizers had based their security measures on informa-
tion sourced from similar, large-scale sports events. As a result, their security focus 
had not been on preventing terrorism, rather it was based on averting demonstra-
tions (such as had occurred at the 1968 Mexico Games). Another factor in their 
rationale for the security planning and indeed the whole image of the 1972 Games 
was to ensure that there would be no comparisons with the 1936 Berlin “Nazi 
Olympics.” According to the Official Report, high visibility of German police was 
still subject to prejudice. As a result, the Games organizers decided there would 
not be highly visible security and that security fencing and other physical barriers 
would not be visually forbidding (Organizing Committee for the Games of the 
XXth Olympiad, 1974).
The Munich massacre was part of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s 
(PLO) overall strategy to bring world attention to its cause. Faud al-Shameli, one 
of the operation’s planners, noted that, “bombing attacks on El Al offices do not 
serve our cause. . . . We have to kill their most important and famous people. Since 
we cannot come close to their statesmen, we have to kill artists and sportsmen” 
(Dershowitz, 2002, p. 41).
Further to the calculated choice of using the Olympic Games, Black September 
issued the following communiqué a week after the killings:
In our assessment, and in light of the result, we have made one of the best 
achievements of Palestinian commando action. A bomb in the White House, a 
mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao Tse-tung, an earthquake in Paris could 
not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the 
operation at Munich. The Olympiad arouses the people’s interest and attention 
more than anything else in the world. The choice of the Olympics, from the 
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purely propagandistic viewpoint was 100% successful. It was like painting the 
name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the 
earth. (Dershowitz, 2002, p. 46)
In 2006, Mohammad Oudeh (known previously as Abu Dauod), the surviving 
planner of the Munich attack, remained convinced of its benefits for the Pales-
tinian cause. He commented, “Before Munich, we were simply terrorists. After 
Munich, at least people started asking ‘Who are these terrorists? What do they 
want?’ Before Munich, nobody had the slightest idea about Palestine” (as quoted 
in Karam, 2006, p. 19).
Since these Games, the Olympics have required far more sophisticated security 
planning coupled with greater organizational complexity as they have involved 
national and international collaboration between security organizations. These 
measures will be discussed in relation to the remaining Games. The result has meant 
more complex logistics, increasing cost for organizers and some Draconian effects 
for athletes, officials, and spectators. For example, Johnson (2006) attributed the 
blowout in the Montréal Games budget from $310 to over $1.5 billion in part to 
the additional security arrangements needed.
Security planning for the Montréal Games was led by the Montréal Urban 
Community Police Department (MUCPD), assisted by the Québec Police Force 
(QPF) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In addition to police in 
uniform, plainclothes officers were assigned to detection and infiltration activities. 
In addition, there was a strong presence of uniformed and armed members of the 
Canadian Forces. Civilian guards were used for crowd control and information 
services. During the Games operations, a total of 17,224 policemen, members of 
the military, and civilian guards were involved. The Organizing Committee, as part 
of its planning, also formed a Security Intelligence Services Subcommittee. This 
comprised members from the RCMP, the MUCPD, the QPF, and the Canadian 
Forces intelligence services. Among its tasks were “to undertake special studies 
of risk, conflict, terrorism, etc.” (Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games 
(COJO), 1978, p. 562).
The most evident result of the new security paradigm was that armed guards 
and police were now conspicuous at venues and in the host city. This adjustment 
did not meet with universal public approval, however. Before the Games, there were 
fears that “over-strict security measures would encourage the security agencies 
to commit excesses, thereby perhaps violating people’s civil rights and liberties” 
(Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (COJO), 1978, p. 570). Although 
these fears were unfounded, the strong security presence caused some critics to 
object that it was practically impossible to come into close contact with the athletes 
even in the areas specially set aside for meetings (Organizing Committee for the 
Olympic Games (COJO), 1978).
Another outcome of the Munich attack was that accredited athletes and officials 
were subjected to much tighter security checks before entering Olympic venues, 
and individuals without accreditation were excluded. The Montréal Games security 
was so intrusive that the organizers received many complaints about the different 
arrangements. Despite these complaints, the security framework developed for 
the Montréal Games has provided the paradigm for all ensuing Olympic security 
operations (Kennelly, 2005). Although it has prevented some attacks, it has not 
prevented a variety of terrorist groups from targeting subsequent Games.
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After South Korea was selected as the site of the 1988 Olympic Games, North 
Korea demanded that it cohost the event. Their demands were rejected. Following 
this rebuff, two fatal bombings were linked directly to North Korean efforts to 
disrupt Games’ preparations. Revelations throughout 1988 about North Korea’s 
complicity in the bombing of a South Korean airliner in November 1987 possibly 
served to prevent the country from any further attempts to create disorder at the 
Games (Pound, 1994). Subsequent to the inauguration of Roh Tae Woo as South 
Korean president, in February 1988, both Japan and the United States provided 
direct security assistance to Korea to ensure that the Games would be secure. Japan 
(base of the terrorist group, The Red Army, which had made threats against the 
Games) monitored thousands of airline flights and visitors passing through Tokyo 
and other Japanese cities en route to the Olympic city; the U.S. deployed addi-
tional air, naval, and security units in and around South Korea before and during 
the Games (Pound, 1994).
In 1992, two Spanish terrorist groups endeavored to disrupt the Barcelona 
Games Opening Ceremony by bombing utility supply routes. At the 1996 Atlanta 
Games, a bomb planted by a lone American antiabortion extremist in Centennial 
Park killed one spectator, resulted in a journalist covering the event dying of a 
heart attack, and injured over 100 more spectators. These instances demonstrated 
that terrorism at an Olympic Games did not have to occur within the confines of 
the sporting venues to impact the Games.
As part of the security preparations for the following Games, held in Sydney, 
an Olympic Intelligence Center was created within the organizing committee to 
provide intelligence-based risk management and identify and prioritize all Games-
related risks. The center had strong links with the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organization (ASIO) (Toohey, 2001). Despite the fact their reports indicated that 
terrorism threats to the Games were considered to be slight, precautions were taken 
to prevent the four potential sources of attack identified: “state agents of terror, 
formalized terrorist groups, loosely affiliated extremists, and lone militants” (The 
Terrorism Research Centre, 2000, p. 1). Islamic extremists, especially groups 
associated with Osama Bin Laden, such as al-Qaeda, were listed as one of the 
loosely affiliated extremist threats. Two alleged terrorist attempts were prevented 
in their planning stages. In 2000, New Zealand police foiled a suspected plot to 
target Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor during the Sydney Olympic Games. During 
an investigation into people smuggling, Auckland police raided a house and found 
evidence suggesting the scheme. At the time it was thought possible that Bin Laden 
was associated with the plot. In May 2000, a man whose home was discovered 
packed with explosives was arrested near the Olympic site, and then, during the 
following month, Australian authorities deported five people linked to extremist 
groups (Operation Olympics: Sydney Is Ready for Terrorists, 2000). These were 
the last Olympic Games before 9/11.
Since the 9/11 terrorism attacks in the United States, the concern of terrorism 
at mega-sporting events has been amplified (Toohey, Taylor, & Lee, 2003), even 
though there was no specific sport connection to the event itself. Olympic organiz-
ers have spent considerably more on security measures, and the perceived risk of 
terrorism has been cited as a reason for low spectator numbers at the 2004 Olympic 
Games and an influence on the experiences of those who attended (Cashman, 2004; 
Taylor & Toohey, 2006).
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The changes to security after 9/11 were clearly evident at the 2002 Salt Lake 
City Winter Olympic Games. Soon after the 9/11 tragedy there was a reevaluation 
of the event’s security procedures (Diaz, 2001). A press statement released by 
the White House outlined the new approach to Games security as “highly visible 
equals highly secure” (Kennelly, 2005; Office of the Press Secretary, 2002). As part 
of the associated strategy, airport security was increased and airspace restricted. 
The Organizing Committee acquired 15,000 antianthrax tablets, and the State of 
Utah commissioned the design and implementation of health monitoring systems 
to detect and manage possible incidents of bioterrorism. Biometric scanners were 
used to identify accredited officials and athletes, and vehicles were prohibited 
within 300 feet of venues and other selected buildings. In total, there were 60 dif-
ferent federal, state, and local agencies, and over 15,000 people, including 10,000 
National Guardsmen, involved in Games-related security operations (Kennelly, 
2005; Snider, 2002). It is estimated that the September 11 attacks resulted in an 
additional US$70 million spending on Games’ security, bringing the total security 
budget to around US$500 million (Snider, 2002). This amount was more than double 
that of the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games (Wicks, 2002), but far less than 
that of the next Games, the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.
Safety and Security Management for 2004 
Athens Olympic Games
The Athens Games have been estimated to have spent over €1.2 billion (US$1.85 
billion) on safety measures, a considerable increase on the original budget of 
€300 million (US$463 million) (Maditinos, Vassiliados, & Charlebois, 2006) and 
more than 10% of the overall Games budget (Johnson, 2006). Despite extensive 
preparations, in the lead-up to the Athens Olympic Games, Greek officials were 
continually called on to reassure the world of their security preparedness. This was 
particularly evident after several incidents of domestic and international terrorism 
in and close to Greece. Early in 2004, two Greek government vehicles were fire-
bombed, coinciding with a visit from the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
President, Jacques Rogge (Kennelly, 2005). A local group claimed responsibility 
for the attack and described it as a protest against the Games and revenge for work-
ers killed in accidents on Olympic construction sites. Then, 100 days before the 
Opening Ceremony, three bombs exploded in Athens (Kennelly, 2005). Although 
no one was harmed in either of these attacks, they signaled that terrorism was a 
distinct possibility during the Games.
An unrelated terrorist incident, the bombing of a peak hour commuter train in 
May 2004, in Madrid, Spain, which killed approximately 200 people, also signaled 
concern for Olympic organizers (Kennelly, 2005). Although Spanish authorities 
initially blamed the Basque separatist group, ETA, it was subsequently discovered 
that the attack in Madrid was the work of a loose-knit terrorist group, allegedly 
linked to al Qaeda and related to Spain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq. 
This led to the suggestion that athletes from countries with troops in Iraq could 
be targeted in Athens at the Olympic Games (Rufford, 2004). Although the IOC 
acknowledged that these bombs raised security concerns, they announced that they 
had complete confidence in the security planning for Athens. Similar to previous 
Games, overall responsibility for the security of the Games resided outside the 
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organizing committee itself. For Athens, it rested with the Hellenic Police, under 
the Ministry of Public Order. A dedicated unit, the Olympic Game Security Division 
(OGSD), was created. It was staffed by personnel from the police, coast guard, 
fire brigade, and defense forces, and reported directly to the chief of police. An 
Olympic Intelligence Center responsible for assessing threats was also created. It 
shared information with over 150 countries (Maditinos et al., 2006). Altogether 
approximately 41,000 security personnel worked at the Games; this was a huge 
increase on the 2,130 security staff at the 1972 Munich Games and a threefold 
increase over the Sydney Games.
In addition, Greece had accepted security planning, training, and intelligence 
assistance from the first-ever international Olympic security team, known as the 
Olympic Advisory Group (OAG). This unit included members from Great Britain, 
Germany, the United States, Spain, France, Australia, and Israel. It met regularly 
to discuss planning, technology, and training issues. Within this framework, the 
Games organizers held operational readiness exercises with British police, as well 
as specialized training sessions with other foreign government agencies represented 
on the OAG (Kennelly, 2005). Moreover, the Greeks also received assistance from 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Kennelly, 2005).
The Olympic Village was guarded by an Olympic Village Security Command 
Center, which employed state-of-the-art security. Other Games-specific security 
planning and operations included border surveillance; air space protection; urban 
domain security; fire safety; terrorist activities response; and chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear threat responses (Maditinos et al., 2006). Even so, some 
security analysts were not convinced of the results of this planning and claimed 
that the Greek government and Games organizers were downplaying the risks, 
despite the fact that Greece had passed antiterrorism legislation and implemented 
unprecedented security planning (Kennelly, 2005). Organizers were also faced with 
possibility of team withdrawals. It was rumored that the United States team would 
pull out if the perceived threat of terrorism was too high (Dahlberg, 2004). In the 
face of this criticism, Athens Mayor Dora Bakoyianni noted, “We are paying the 
price for September 11” (Lui, Vlahou, & Robert, 2004, p. 22).
Regardless of IOC and Games organizers’ assurances, the Australian govern-
ment was not convinced of safety measures and caused an altercation with Greek 
Olympic officials by issuing warnings about traveling to Greece. Athens Olympic 
Organizing Committee (ATHOC) President Gianna Angelopoulos-Daskalaki was 
unconvinced of the merits of the concerns emanating from the country of the “best 
ever Games” (Toohey, 2006). She was quoted as saying, “Australia chose, in the very 
middle of an overwhelmingly successful IOC Coordination Commission meeting, 
to release a warning about traveling to Greece. This is damaging to the Olympic 
Games” (Athens Olympic Organizing Committee, 2004).
At Games time, the security force included tens of thousands of trained per-
sonnel, fighter jets, and airborne surveillance. Its arsenal included Patriot, Stinger, 
and Hawk missiles. There was naval and port security. Athens 2004 turned out to 
be the most guarded Olympic Games in history and the “biggest, most expensive 
peacetime security operation ever” (Wilson, 2004). Despite, or perhaps because of, 
all the pre-Games safety concerns, there were no major terrorism incidents during 
the event. The most tragic security-related episode occurred when a security guard, 
who was playing Russian roulette while on duty, killed himself.
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Fear and the Precaution Principle: The Case of Athens
Safety and security planning has always been a key function of stadium and arena 
management, with “venue managers needing to keep their venues safe and secure 
within a broad risk management perspective” (Sweaney, 2005, p. 22). In the cur-
rent culture of fear, much has been made of the possibility that mega-sports-event 
attendance might be an activity that people choose to pass up because of their 
perceptions of risk. Alternatively, sport event attendance can be used to publicly 
demonstrate attendees’ resistance to terrorism and resilience to fear and anxiety.
A study by Toohey and Taylor (2005) at the 2004 Olympic Games investigated 
the reasons why attendees chose to attend the Athens Games and their perceptions of 
safety and security concerns. Of the 277 Olympic Games attendees they surveyed, 
21% had considered not coming to Athens because of safety concerns, and 12% 
indicated that feeling safe was an important consideration in their decision to attend. 
When asked why they chose to still come despite concerns, their responses were 
grouped into four categories, “Defiants” (with statements such as “Not willing to 
live in fear or put my life on hold”), “Precautionaries” (“We have confidence in the 
security”), “Blind Devotees” (“I love the Olympic Games too much not to come”), 
and “Indifferents” ( “I still got to live life” and “You could die anywhere”).
The research reported that 24% of respondents indicated that they did not feel 
safe during the event. Men, more than women, felt security measures detracted 
from their Olympic experience. All of the attendees classified as “Blind Devotees” 
noted safety as “unimportant” in their decision to attend the event. Attendees from 
Greece, Ireland, Germany, and France were more likely to place low levels of 
importance on safety aspects and to indicate that Games’ related security detracted 
from their Olympic experience. On the other hand, attendees from China, Japan, 
and Korea were more likely to report that security enhanced their experience and 
attached a high level of importance on safety and security procedures. These find-
ings suggest gender and cultural differences in expectations of event security and 
perceptions of risk.
Toohey and Taylor (2005) listed the respondents’ suggestions for “best-
practice” in sport event safety and security management under five categories: 
visibility (e.g., “Security needs to be seen”); resilience (e.g., “Be tough on terror-
ists”); communication (e.g., “Brief spectators in advance” and “Ensure the [host] 
language plus English is understood by security”); restraint/caution (e.g., “Don’t 
judge spectators by their ethnic appearance”; and minimalism (e.g., “Security is 
too much,” and “too intrusive”). This list is reflective of the different expectations 
and perceptions of risk and safety of event attendees.
Another consideration is the level at which safety and security is conceptual-
ized. For example, security can be viewed from the individual’s perspective if they 
are attending the event on their own; from a group perspective if they are traveling 
with others; and from a community context, that is all the attendees or all the local 
residents next to the venue (Trim & Caravelli, 2007). The type of risk that each 
perceives as relating to them and how likely it is that this risk will materialize adds 
another layer to our analysis.
Taking the information we have about the Games organizers’ approaches to 
risk management and attendee data, we posit that the Athens case is illustrative 
of the general tenets of Beck’s (1992) premise for a risk society. In particular, the 
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increased public commitment to prevent risk and focus on safety is evident in the 
global involvement in the provision of risk management support via physical and 
human resources, technology, and knowledge transfer to accompany the massive 
infusion of funds by the Greek organizers. The use of such an extensive range 
of risk management initiatives, taken together with the press releases and public 
information measures issued by the event organizers, suggest that the precautionary 
principle and risk aversion (Furedi, 2002) pervaded the event planning process. On 
the other hand, Games attendees, by the mere virtue of their presence in Athens, 
defied the risk society’s predictions of overt anxiety and fear. Atheide’s (2003) 
discourse of fear was manifest in a small proportion of the event attendees and was 
reflected via the ‘precautionaries’ category reported by Toohey and Taylor (2005). 
A large number of attendees also demonstrated, however, that their lives were not 
framed by danger. This latter group of Athens 2004 visitors included the aggres-
sively anti-fear “defiants,” the “blind devotees” who noted that they would attend 
the Olympic Games regardless of external contexts, and the cynical “indifferents” 
who were summarily dismissive about the threat of terrorism at the Games.
Fear, Precaution, Defiance, and Indifference 
to Terrorism
Since 9/11, the threat of the appropriation of the Olympic Games as a site of terror, 
at the operational level, has resulted in a positive backlash of increased governmental 
cooperation and multinational networking. These responses are clearly in line with 
Kenny’s (2004) contention that there is a perceived need to develop strategies to 
confront risk and lives framed by danger. Although the risk society has pervaded 
sport event attendance, its diffusion is far from complete.
As we have seen at Athens 2004, not all members of the public engaged with 
the precautionary principle and presumably even those that did might soon object to 
being searched in an intrusive way, or subject to tight security demands (Sweaney, 
2005). Therefore, the choice of safety and security methods to be used at mega-
sporting events, especially at the Olympic Games, is open to reconceptualization and 
repositioning. Although there is a legitimate and important place for risk manage-
ment and technology in sport event management, Games organizers also need to 
understand the range of emotional responses by consumers to these solutions and 
the reasons for both positive and negative reactions. As Durodié (2004a) argues, 
too much reliance on technical solutions can actually heighten the sense of risk.
Perhaps sport can offer one of the best sites of resistance to risk society’s con-
fines if event organizers address the issue of how to strike an acceptable balance 
between the risk management necessities created by and through the precautionary 
principle and the cycle of cynicism and disengagement created by the culture of fear. 
This proposition requires more field-based research to explore these issues across 
different events, countries and contexts. According to Elliot et al. (1999),
Safety is important in all sectors of the sports and leisure industry. The com-
placency which is shattered only by the occasional disaster and radical change 
needs to be replaced by a marked willingness to seek out and adopt best practice, 
informed by the results of relevant research. (p. 26)
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There are a number of ways that empirical research in this area can be used to 
develop better event-based operational procedures, as well as enhancing macro-level 
strategies in the current terrorism-alert risk society. First, there is the value of using 
theory that emanates from another discipline such as overviewed here, to better 
understand sport-specific, mega-event attendance. There is also a need to develop 
a sport-focused research agenda in this area (Chalip, 2006), that is, uncovering 
theory that is specifically grounded in the sport phenomena but which can then 
have relevance to other industries (such as tourism). From the results of these foci, 
mega-sport event organizers can then work towards ensuring that spectators have 
positive and safe experiences. These experiences should be grounded in understand-
ing the cultural contexts of the consumers as well as the host city and nation. The 
management of risk should not be exclusively based on technological solutions 
that might ultimately exacerbate spectators’ perception of risk and decrease their 
desire to attend the Games.
There is a real prospect of government and Olympic organizers overreacting 
and expending excessive resources on counter-terrorism actions. The cost of such 
measures will further limit the number of nations able to afford staging Olympic 
Games. There is also a danger of risk amplification whereby the message above 
the level of risk is accelerated by the media, government, experts, pressure groups, 
and the like. Thus there is a need to approach risk management, fear minimiza-
tion, and precautions sensibly. In this respect, the amount and type of information 
communicated to the general public should be regulated and monitored to avoid 
unnecessary escalation of fear. It is important also to distinguish between uncertainty 
and risk so that presence of the associated security measures can be adequately 
conveyed to potential and actual sport event attendees. Similarly, the political cli-
mate and cultural practices of the host nation need to be taken into consideration 
to be inclusive of non-Western nations.
The host’s ability to effectively manage safety-related terrorism concerns across 
the spectrum of Olympic stakeholders will be very relevant to the 2008 Olympic 
Games to be staged in Beijing and of course in London in 2012. The July 7, 2005 
attacks in London and subsequent spoiled terrorism acts have left many residents 
wary of future attacks. The Olympic Games organizers, participants, media, com-
panies and businesses, governmentalities, and other organizations associated with 
the event will need to work together to ensure a successful collective approach to 
managing risk perceptions and promoting enjoyment of the Games that leaves all 
stakeholders with a positive and rewarding legacy.
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